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ABSTRACT
The paper presents a novel approach of spoofing wireless signals by
using a general adversarial network (GAN) to generate and trans-
mit synthetic signals that cannot be reliably distinguished from
intended signals. It is of paramount importance to authenticate
wireless signals at the PHY layer before they proceed through the
receiver chain. For that purpose, various waveform, channel, and
radio hardware features that are inherent to original wireless sig-
nals need to be captured. In the meantime, adversaries become
sophisticated with the cognitive radio capability to record, ana-
lyze, and manipulate signals before spoofing. Building upon deep
learning techniques, this paper introduces a spoofing attack by
an adversary pair of a transmitter and a receiver that assume the
generator and discriminator roles in the GAN and play a minimax
game to generate the best spoofing signals that aim to fool the
best trained defense mechanism. The output of this approach is
two-fold. From the attacker point of view, a deep learning-based
spoofing mechanism is trained to potentially fool a defense mecha-
nism such as RF fingerprinting. From the defender point of view,
a deep learning-based defense mechanism is trained against po-
tential spoofing attacks when an adversary pair of a transmitter
and a receiver cooperates. The probability that the spoofing sig-
nal is misclassified as the intended signal is measured for random
signal, replay, and GAN-based spoofing attacks. Results show that
the GAN-based spoofing attack provides a major increase in the
success probability of wireless signal spoofing even when a deep
learning classifier is used as the defense.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications is susceptible to adversaries due to the
open and shared nature of wireless medium. Among various wire-
less attacks, the spoofing attack is launched by an adversary that
aims to mimic a legitimate user in its transmissions. This attack may
serve different purposes including primary user emulation (PUE)
in cognitive radio networks, passing through signal authentication
systems, and intrusion into protected networks. One common ap-
proach for wireless signal spoofing is recording a legitimate user’s
transmission and replaying the signal later by potentially adjust-
ing the transmit power. While this approach can represent various
features in the signal at a high level, it may fall short of reliably
mimicking combined waveform, channel, and device effects. In
this context, machine learning provides automated means to au-
thenticate signals by analyzing wireless signals and identifying
anomalies. Enabled by recent advances in computational resources,
deep learning can effectively process raw spectrum data and op-
erate on latent representations, while analyzing high-dimensional
spectrum dynamics that feature-based machine learning algorithms
fail to achieve.
Deep learning finds rich applications in wireless communica-
tions, including spectrum sensing [1] and modulation recognition
[2]. On the other hand, the adversary can also apply deep learning
to launch wireless attacks. For example, an adversary may try to
learn the underlying transmit behavior by training a deep neural
network and effectively jam data transmissions [3]. There are vari-
ous security concerns regarding the safe use of machine learning
algorithms. Adversarial machine learning [4, 5] studies learning in
the presence of adversaries and aims to enable safe adoption of
machine learning to the emerging applications such as wireless
communications. For example, the adversary may manipulate input
data into a machine learning classifier by jamming the sensing
period [6]. Similarly, an adversary may launch an evasion attack by
manipulating signals over the air so as to force a receiver in making
wrong signal classification decisions [7–10].
In this paper, we introduce a spoofing attack motivated by adver-
sarial machine learning. In particular, consider training a generative
adversarial network (GAN) to spoof wireless signals as if they origi-
nate from intended users (legitimate or higher priority users such as
primary users). GAN has been extensively applied to other domains
such as computer vision and text analytics to generate synthetic
data that is statistically similar to real data [11]. Recently, there
have been efforts to apply GAN to wireless communications. The
focus has been to augment the training data sets such as those used
to train classifiers for spectrum sensing [1] and jamming [12]. In
this paper, our goal is to train a GAN from an adversarial point
of view to spoof wireless signals that cannot be reliably discrimi-
nated from intended signals. Different from applications in other
domains such as computer vision, data in wireless medium is re-
ceived through channel and (transmitter and receiver) hardware
effects, and depends on transmitter-receiver positions that all need
to be matched by the GAN. In this context, a receiver (assuming the
role of a defender) aims to classify signal sources as intended user or
not. This classification can be done by using a deep learning based
classifier to analyze spectrum sensing results. Then the adversary
launches a spoofing attack such that the classifier at the receiver
incorrectly authenticates its transmissions as intended.
As a starting point, we show that a deep learning-based classifier
can distinguish signals of an intended transmitter T from other
randomly generated signals. Given that each device introduces its
own phase shift and each channel has its own propagation gain and
phase shift, such a classifier can be built at a receiver R by collecting
spectrum sensing results for signals from T and other signals, and
processing them to obtain a number of features for each sample.
These features and labels (from T or not) form the training data to
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build a classifier by deep learning. We show that such a classifier
can successfully distinguish different signals. In particular, we can
regard signals from other transmitter as a naive spoofing attack
with random signals. This naive attack, as we expected, does not
perform well. Its success probability (the probability that signals
from other transmitter is classified as from T ) is limited to only
7.89%.
We then study the replay attack, where an adversary transmitter
AT amplifies and forwards the previously received signal from
T . This attack keeps some pattern of T (but not the entire), and
thus is better than using random signals. We show that the success
probability increases to 36.2% against a defender that uses a deep
learning classifier. However, this probability is still much less than
50%, i.e., most of replay-based spoofing attacks based on amplifying
and forwarding signals are still not successful.
To launch a successful spoofing attack, the adversary transmitter
AT needs to generate signals such that signals received from AT
are statistically similar to signals received from T . The challenge is
thatAT does not have any knowledge onT ’s waveform (in our case,
characterized by the modulation scheme), its phase shift, as well as
the channel between T and R. In this paper, we introduce a GAN-
based approach to capture all these effects from observed signals
and generate spoofing signals without the need of prior knowledge
(that may not be available at all due to unpredictable spectrum
dynamics). The transmitter and its surrogate receiver (used only
for training) are trained offline as the generator-discriminator pair
of the GAN to generate the best spoofing signals that aim to fool
the best-trained defense mechanism. The output is a signal gen-
erator that creates wireless signals with fake signatures to spoof
signals. This generator is trained as a deep neural network to fool
the optimized discriminator that is trained as another deep neural
network.
During the training, AT provides some flag to label its transmis-
sions, and thus AR knows the true label. AR processes received
signals, obtains features, and builds a discriminator to classify sig-
nals as from T or not. The classification results are sent back to AT
as feedback. Then AT updates its generator to generate better syn-
thetic data, namely to increase classification error probability atAR .
Thus, AT and AR play a minimax game, which forms a GAN to im-
prove both generator and discriminator. Once GAN converges, the
generator at AT can generate high fidelity synthetic data (similar
to real data) for spoofing attack. This approach inherently captures
all waveform, channel, and device effects jointly. As a result, the
success probability of spoofing attack increases to 76.2%, when the
GAN-based approach is used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
related work. Section 3 describes the system model. Section 4 de-
scribes the pre-trained classifier to detect intended transmissions.
Section 5 describes and compares the replay and GAN-based spoof-
ing attacks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
There are different types of attacks on wireless communications
in the literature [13]. In particular, attacks on spectrum sensing
include spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack [14, 15],
primary user emulation (PUE) attack [16], eavesdropping [17], and
noncooperation [18]. Attacks on data transmission include jamming
[19] in form of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack [20] with different
levels of prior information [21]. There are also attacks on higher
layers, e.g., attacks on routing in the network layer [22] and network
flow inference attacks [23]. Defense methods were developed to
address these attacks. For example, an adaptive, jamming-resistant
spectrum access protocol was proposed in [24] for cognitive radio ad
hoc networks, where there are multiple channels that the secondary
users can utilize. Jamming games between a cognitive user and
a smart jammer was considered in [25], where they individually
determine their transmit powers.
Launching and detecting spoofing attacks have been extensively
studied [26–30]. Spoofing along with other attacks such as jamming
and sniffing were assessed in [26] A spoofing attack was designed
in [27] using optimal power distribution. In this paper, we optimize
both power and phase shift for spoofing attack. Received signal
strength (RSS) was used to in [28, 29] detect spoofing attack. In
this paper, we use raw spectrum sensing (I/Q) samples. Recently,
deep learning was also applied to detect spoofing attacks, e.g., CNN
was used in [30], while the use of deep learning in this paper is to
optimize launching spoofing attacks.
Wireless security finds rich applications of deep learning. Deep
learning was applied to authenticate signals [31], detect and classify
jammers of different types [32, 33], and control communications to
mitigate jamming effects [25, 32]. Jammers typically do not use ma-
chine learning techniques, e.g., [32, 34]. Recently, there have been
efforts to build deep learning-based jammers [3, 6]. Using wireless
sensors, deep learning was also used to infer private information in
analogy to exploratory attacks [35]. From a different perspective,
GAN was applied to model wireless communication channels, e.g.,
[36–38]. In this paper, we use GAN to generate synthetic spoofing
signals, which need to model not only channel effects but also de-
vice related effects such as phase shift as well as relative positions
of transmitters and receivers from both attacker and defender sides.
Adversarial deep learning was applied to launch evasion attacks
by adding perturbations to the received signals and manipulating
the input to the machine learning algorithm. [7–10] considered
evasion attacks against modulation classifiers. In this paper, we
consider a spoofing attack with the same final goal as the evasion
attack. However, the classifier to fool in this paper does not only
use modulation but also channel effects, device related effects such
as phase shifts, and relative positions of transmitters and receivers
of both attacker and defender. As a baseline, we consider the re-
play (amplify and forward) attack [39, 40] as a method of spoofing.
However, although replay attack can keep some features in original
signals, it is not very effective. The limits of replaying signals as the
spoofing attack were assessed in [39]. Also, schemes to detect replay
attacks were reported in [40]. In this paper, our results show that
GAN-based spoofing significantly outperforms the replay attack.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless communication environment with intended
users (such as legitimate or high-priority) and others (such as the
adversary). We assume that a pre-trained deep learning-based clas-
sifier is used at a receiver to predict whether a transmission is from
an intended one, or not.
Real data: 𝒙
Synthetic data:
𝐺(𝒛)
Noise: 𝒛Generator 𝐺
Discriminator 𝐷
Real or 
Synthetic
Figure 1: GAN structure.
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Figure 2: Network topology during the training process for
spoofing attack.
The adversary aims to launch a spoofing attack such that its
transmissions are classified as an intended one. Due to unique de-
vice properties (such as phase shift) and communication channel
properties (such as channel gain), we show that random signal
transmission by an adversary can be easily detected as an unin-
tended transmission. Thus, the adversary needs to learn the pattern
of intended transmissions and generate its transmissions following
the same pattern for spoofing attack. Two adversaries collaborate
for this purpose and act as a transmitter-receiver pair to train a
GAN (see Fig. 1). In particular, a generator is trained at the trans-
mitter and a discriminator is trained at the receiver. In the spoofing
attack (namely, test phase), only the generator at the transmitter is
used.
In this paper, we consider the scenario that there is an intended
transmitter T , a receiver R (that classifies if received signals are
from T , or not), an adversary transmitter AT , and an adversary
receiver AR . T transmits with power P = 1000. There is a device-
related phase shift for T , which is unknown to adversaries AT and
AR . We assume a Rayleigh channel between any two nodes. R has
a deep learning-based classifier to classify whether signal is from
T or other transmitters, e.g., AT . We consider three methods for
spoofing attacks.
1. Random signal attack: AT performs random transmissions
with power P .
2. Replay attack:AT amplifies and forwards previously received
signal from T . Since AT does not have any knowledge on
channel gains, it cannot optimally tune its power. Thus, AT
uses power P to amplify signals.
3. GAN-based spoofing attack: AT generates synthetic signals
using GAN. The transmission power is up to P .
Transmitter 𝑇
at (0,0)
User 𝑅
at (10,0)
Adversary 
transmitter 𝐴𝑇
at (0,10)
Figure 3: Network topology during the spoofing attack.
The generation process of the GAN-based spoofing attack is as
follows. The adversary receiver AR is placed close to R such that
channel from T (or AT ) to AR is similar to channel T (or AT ) to
R. Thus, AR can receive similar signals as R and if AR cannot dis-
tinguish signals from T and AT , R cannot either. AT makes its
transmissions with a flag such that AR knows these signals are
from AT (i.e., the true label). AR builds a discriminator to classify
signals from T or AT , and transmits the classification results to AT
as feedback. Then AT builds a generator to improve its transmitted
signals such that these signals are more similar to T ’s signals in
terms of resulting in larger classification error at AR . This process
continues several rounds until convergence. In this setting, AT and
AR play a minimax game, which is exactly the GAN process (see
Fig. 2). When the GAN converges, the generator at AT should be
able to generate synthetic signals very similar toT ’s signals, which
are then used for spoofing attack (see Fig. 3).
The advantage of this attack is that the adversary does not need
to assume any prior knowledge on T , which will be learned by AR .
Moreover, the adversary does not need to learn channel effect ex-
plicitly. Instead, channel effects such as phase shift and propagation
gain are learned implicitly through collaboration of AT with AR .
4 THE CLASSIFIER FOR SIGNAL
AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we describe the pre-trained classifier at R that needs
to identify whether a transmission is from T or not. We assume
that T transmits data using the QPSK modulation. Note that other
modulations can also be used without changing the algorithms
(classifiers) developed in this paper. The transmit power is P and the
wireless channels are Rayleigh channel. R uses limited sensing data,
say 8 bits of data. Under QPSK, there are four possible modulated
signals, where each signal may have a different phase shift for 2
bits. In addition, each device has its own phase shift. Denote θT as
the phase shift of T , which is added on the QPSK signal’s phase
shift. Note that other settings on the number of bits in sensing data
and modulation will not affect the developed algorithms.
R trains a deep neural network classifier to analyze spectrum
sensing results and identifies whether a transmission is from T or
not. This classifier is pre-trained using many samples with labels
on whether a transmission is from T or not. Each sample has four
signals and each received signal is sampled 100 times. Thus, there
are 400 features for each sample. As an example, for two bits 0 and 0,
QPSK determines a phase shift π4 for coded signal. Adding θT and
a random channel phase shift θTR under the Rayleigh model, the
received signal has phase shift π4 +θT +θTR . The k-th sample point,
0 ≤ k < 100, has phase shift π4 + θT + θTR + kπ50 . The received
power is дTRP , where дTR is a random channel gain under the
Rayleigh model. The mean value of channel gain is d−2, where d is
the distance between a transmitter and a receiver. Then the k-th
sampled data is
dkTR = дTRPe
j( π4 +θT +θTR+ kπ50 ) . (1)
During the training, T may send a flag to indicate its transmissions
and this flag is used to label samples. After observing a certain
period of time, R collects a number of samples with labels to be
used as training data to build a deep learning classifier.
Once a classifier is built, R uses it to predict signal labels (‘T ’ or
‘not T ’). For this algorithm, there may be two types of errors:
• Misdetection. The signal is from T but it is detected as from
other transmitters.
• False alarm. The signal is from other transmitters but it is
detected as from T .
R aims to minimize the probability of both errors. Denote eMD
and eFA as the probabilities of misdetection and false alarm at R,
respectively. Then the objective is to minimizemax{eMD , eFA}. For
a given test data with n samples and nT as the number of samples
with signals from T , denote nMD as the number of misdetections
and nFA as the number of false alarms. These error probabilities
are calculated by
eMD =
nMD
nT
, eFA =
nFA
n − nT . (2)
We use TensorFlow to build a deep learning classifier for R. In
particular, we use the following deep neural network:
• A feedforward neural network is trained with backpropa-
gation function by using cross-entropy as the loss function.
The structure of a feedforward neural network is shown in
Figure 4.
• Number of hidden layers is 3.
• Number of neurons per hidden layer is 50.
• Rectified linear unit (ReLU) is used as activation function at
hidden layers.
• Softmax is used as the activation function at output layer.
• Batch size is 100.
• Number of training steps is 1000.
Note that R can further optimize the hyperparameters (e.g., num-
ber of layers and number of neurons per layer) of its deep neural
network.
In the simulation setting, the location ofT is (0, 0), the location of
R is (10, 0), the location ofAT is (0, 10), the location ofAR is (10, 0.1)
(see Figs. 2 and 3), and the normalized transmit power at B is 1000.
R collects 1000 samples, each with 400 spectrum sensing results,
and a label (‘T ’ or ‘notT ’) as training data and applies the classifier
on another 1000 samples to evaluate accuracy. We used the above
deep neural network and tuned its parameters. We find that batch
size 150 can achieve better performance, while other parameters
weight
+
bias
𝜎
activation function
Input 
features
Output
labels
Input layer
Hidden layers
Output layer
Figure 4: The structure of a feedforward neural network.
are unchanged. There are 504 signals from T and 496 signals from
other transmitters in the test data. Among them, 39 signals from
other transmitters are identified as from T and 37 signals from T
are identified as not fromT . Thus, we obtain eFA = 39/496 = 7.86%,
eMD = 37/504 = 7.34%. Both errors are small, showing that R can
reliably determine the signal labels. We can also regard this case as
a naive spoofing attack, where the adversary uses random signals
to attack. The success probability of this attack is only 7.86%.
5 SPOOFING ATTACKS
There is an adversary transmitter AT that aims to mimic the trans-
mitterT ’s behavior such that R classifies signals fromAT as fromT .
AT does not have knowledge on T ’s device related phase shift, or
the channel between T and R. Instead, an adversary receiver AR is
placed close to R to learn received signal pattern from T and from
AT . In the replay attack, AR is not used.
5.1 Replay Attack based on Amplifying and
Forwarding Signals
We start with the replay attack based on simply amplifying and
forwarding signals, i.e.,AT records previously received signals from
T , amplifies to power P and forwards them to R. Assume that θAT
is the phase shift for AT , θi j is the phase shift and дi j is a random
channel gain for the Rayleigh channel from node i to node j. T ’s
parameters are unknown to AT . As an example, for two bits 0 and
0, QPSK determines a phase shift π4 . the received phase shift at R
is π4 + θTAT + θAT + θAT R and the received power is дAT RP . The
k-th sampled data then becomes
dkAT R = дAT RPe
j( π4 +θT +θTAT +θAT +θAT R ) . (3)
On the other hand, if the same signal is transmitted by T , the k-th
sampled data is
dkTR = дTRPe
j( π4 +θT +θTR ) . (4)
We can see that both received power and phase shift in (3) and (4)
are different. However, a simple detector based on discriminating
received power and/or phase shift cannot work. The reason is that
a detector needs to make a classification based on limited data
samples, e.g., when an intruder is authenticated at the physical
layer. Due to random channel, the estimation of received power
and phase shift cannot be accurate. As a result, if we set a small
region around the actual value of T , we will end up with a large
misdetection probability. On the other hand, if we set a large region,
the false alarm probability will be large.
Simulation results show that the replay attack is better than
transmitting random signals, i.e., the success probability of spoof-
ing is increased to 36.2%, which is much larger than the success
probability 7.86% if AT transmits random signals. This is because
by amplifying and forwarding signals, only some signal pattern
from T is kept. However, as we showed above, signals from T and
forwarded by AT are different even for the same data. Thus, R can
still successfully classify most of spoofing signals.
5.2 GAN-based Spoofing Attack
We now consider the spoofing attack based on the GAN [11]. As
the first step, AR collects 500 signal samples from T and 500 signal
samples from AT , where AT can flag its transmissions such that
AR can have ground truth. Each sample has coded data of 8 bits
under the QPSK modulation, i.e., 4 signals. The sampling rate for a
signal is 100, and thus the total data (features) for a sample is 400.
AR then builds the first version of discriminator D based on these
data samples with the objective of minimizing classification error,
i.e.,
min
D
Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))] − Ex∼pdata [log(D(x))] , (5)
where z is a noise input to generatorG with a random distribution of
pz andG(z) is the generator output and input datax has distribution
pdata .
On the other hand, AT collects the classification result from AR ,
builds the first version of generator G to generate synthetic data,
and then transmits synthetic data to AR . The objective of AT is
maximizing AR ’s classification error, i.e.,
max
G
Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))] − Ex∼pdata [log(D(x))], (6)
where D is the first version of discriminator.
This process continues with updatedG andD. BothG andD have
three hidden dense layers, each with 128 neurons. They improve
in each round until convergence. The entire process forms a GAN
with a minimax game played between AT and AR .
max
G
min
D
Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))] − Ex∼pdata [log(D(x))] , (7)
although traditionally GAN is running at one entity. Note that when
G is trained with the objective in (6), the gradients of G rapidly
vanish, which makes the training of GAN very difficult. To address
the vanishing gradient problem, we use
max
G
Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))] (8)
as the objective function at G [11]. Once converged, AT can apply
its generator to generate and transmit synthetic signals. After going
through the wireless channel, the transmitted signals are received
by R, which are statistically similar to the received signals from T .
We use the same simulation setting as that in Section 4. The
only difference is that signals from other transmitters is replaced by
synthetic signals from AT , where these synthetic signals are gener-
ated by AT ’s generator. For convergence, we check the maximum
perturbation in G and D loss functions over the most recent 100
epochs of GAN training. When this perturbation drops below 5%
of current loss value, we terminate the GAN training. This way, the
Table 1: Success probability of spoofing attack by different
methods.
Method of spoofing attack Success probability
Random signal 7.89%
Replay (Amplify and forward) 36.2%
GAN-based spoofing 76.2%
Table 2: The impact of AT ’s mobility on success probability
of spoofing attack.
AT ’s location Success probability
(0, 10) 76.2%
(0, 11) 65.2%
(0, 15) 61.0%
(0, 20) 56.2%
GAN is run only for 478 epochs in this simulation setting. We find
that the same classifier pre-trained at R, which works very well to
discriminate signals from T from random or replayed signals, can-
not successfully identify synthetic signals generated by the GAN.
The success probability of spoofing attack is increased to 76.2%,
when the GAN is used by the adversary.
Finally, we consider a more challenging case whereAT ’s location
is changed after the training process, e.g., AT moves from (0, 10).
AT may request the collaboration of AR to retrain a GAN and use
its updated generator for spoofing attack. If such update is not
available,AT can still use its current generator to launch the attack.
Table 2 shows results under different AT locations. We can see that
as AT moves away fromT , the attack success probability decreases.
This is an expected result since the distribution of the received
channel characteristics varies as the receiver moves to a different
location. However, the attack success probability is still significantly
higher than the one achieved by the replay attack.
6 CONCLUSION
We designed a novel approach of spoofing wireless signals by gener-
ating synthetic signals by the GAN. We considered the case that an
adversary transmits synthetic signals such that they are misclassi-
fied as the intended ones. We first showed that if there is no attack,
a pre-trained deep learning-based classifier can distinguish signals
reliably. We then considered a simple spoofing mechanism such as
the replay (amplify-and-forward) attack that can only keep some
pattern of intended signals. Therefore, the success probability of
replay attack against a deep learning-based classifier remains lim-
ited. In this paper, we designed a GAN-based spoofing attack that
generates synthetic data that is transmitted by an adversary trans-
mitter and distinguishes real and synthetic data at an adversary
receiver. The minimax game between the adversary transmitter
and receiver tunes both the generator and the discriminator. Then
the signals generated by the GAN generator are transmitted for
spoofing attack. The GAN-based spoofing attack provides a ma-
jor improvement in attack success probability over the random
signal and replay attacks even when the node locations change
from training to test time. As the GAN opens us new opportunities
to effectively spoof wireless signals, new defense mechanisms are
called for as future work.
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